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Albert Camus and the Anticolonials: Why Camus Would Not
Play the Zero Sum Game1
James D. Le Sueur, University of Nebraska, Lincoln

In 1994, I returned from Paris to Hyde Park just in time to catch a
lecture about Albert Camus that an esteemed colleague, the late Tony
Judt, was giving at the University of Chicago. I was much younger then,
eager to engage in debate, and I had just spent most of the past two years
turning over the recently opened pages of Camus’ private papers in
Paris and trolling through the private papers of other prominent French
intellectuals, as well as newly declassified state archives for what was to
become my first book, Uncivil War.2 I had also done dozens of interviews
with Camus’ friends and fellow travelers (Jean Daniel, Germaine Tillion,
Jean Pélégri, etc.), as well as old adversaries (including Françis Jeanson).
To the person, out of the many dozens of interviews I conducted, when
asked about Albert Camus everyone agreed that he had died well before
his time, that he was a deeply admirable and humane writer, and that he
had paid much too heavy of a price for efforts to achieve a peaceful solution to the bloody drama in Algeria. Moreover, when I conducted these
interviews throughout the 1990s, every single interviewee I spoke with,
including Claude Levi-Strauss, Pierre Bourdieu, and Jacques Vergės, also
admitted that they had all modified their stances on Algerian nationalism
and were far more critical of their unchecked anticolonialism having
seen its failures in Algeria.3 Finally, they all agreed that Camus could
not be understood without foregrounding Algeria and decolonization in
any reading of him.
Yet, what they said about Camus contrasted remarkably with Judt’s
statements. I cannot remember what set me off, but I knew that I did not
understand or agree with what Judt was saying about Albert Camus. Part
of my objection to Judt’s broader work on French intellectuals was the
contrast between his emphasis on the Second World War and the Cold
War and my own emphasis on decolonization. To be sure, decolonization was then a new and emerging field, but, there was enough known to
suggest that decolonization had transformed France and therefore Camus
in fundamental and indisputable ways. Hence, decolonization’s role was
not as minor as Judt had maintained. Legitimate and scholarly objections
aside, I quite simply made a royal ass out of myself by criticizing him
© South Central Review 31.3 (Fall 2014): 27–42.
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so publically (something I later deeply regretted). This essay is a kind
of posthumous apology to my colleague, Tony Judt.
My visceral over-reaction to Judt’s talk 20 years ago reflects a continuing Camus debate. Why do Albert Camus and decolonization, a distant
historical figure on the one hand and an intricate historical process on
the other, continue to ignite such spirited disagreement among friends
and colleagues?

The Politics of a Zero Sum Game
To begin, Albert Camus is not a minor intellectual figure in the history
of twentieth-century France, intellectual history, or colonial history. He
is and remains one of the most important intellectuals of the twentieth
century. Therefore, what is said about him carries a certain gravitas. At
the same time, he is also a very important figure in the history of French
colonialism and decolonization in Algeria, and perhaps one of the most
controversial. Nevertheless, our understanding of Albert Camus and
the often nasty milieu of French intellectuals in which he circulated
remains filtered through the lens of a zero sum game that is aberrated
by many unexamined biases. Put simply, this zero sum world-view of
French intellectuals in this contentious post-war period pitched one
writer against another in often very public and very brutal debates. As
a younger scholar, the high stakes intellectual game made perfect sense
to me precisely because I was educated to play this assassins’ academic
game at the University of Chicago. Intellectuals in France during decolonization played to win and they played for keeps, and the way to
win was to destroy one’s opponent completely and publically. This is
still true today, of course.
Writers like Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, two of Camus’ closest equals (in terms of intellectual stature), played this game
to perfection. As it became increasingly clear that Camus held different
positions from them on their most valued abstractions such as revolution,
Marxism and anticolonialism, intellectuals like Sartre and de Beauvoir
became increasingly brutal with Camus, and increasingly ad hominem.
They aimed at his Achilles’ heel: his settler roots in Algeria. Hence, what
should been an advantage because he simply knew more about Algeria
and North Africa than Sartre and de Beauvoir did together, became for
them an identity to attack. However, well before they began to attack
Camus in earnest, when Camus was a much better known and more
respected writer than they, he began to record his ambivalence and
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misgivings about the increasingly acidic tone of Sartre’s critiques. For
example, on March 9, 1943, Camus noted in a letter to his friend and
mentor, Jean Grenier:
I received Cahiers du Sud. Sartre’s article is a model of
“dismantling.” Of course, in every creation there is an intuitive
element which he doesn’t envision. Intelligence doesn’t play such
an unimportant part. But in criticism, it’s the rule of the game,
and that’s just fine, since on several occasions he enlightened me
about what I wanted to say. I also know most of his criticisms
are fair, but why this acid tone?4

A decade later, during the French-Algerian War (1954–1962), Sartre
and de Beauvoir became even more caustic. Their reputation had also
grown after WWII, and they were peers. Despite or perhaps because of
Camus’ international stature and his determination to find a peaceful
solution to the Algerian crisis, Sartre and de Beauvoir evidenced a clear
disdain for their former friend. By this time, anticolonialism had come
in vogue, and this fit well with both their very honest concerns for human freedom and with their desire to highlight connections between a
Marxist/socialist world-view and the emerging nationalist movements.
Ironically, just as American policy-makers during the 1940s, 1950s, and
1960s began to read these “Third World” revolts through the narrow
lens of hegemonic Communism—something that led to foreign policy
blunders by US presidents such as the 1953 CIA-MI6 coup d’état against
Mohammed Mosaddegh in Iran, and the Bay of Pigs in 1961—radical
anticolonial writers such as Sartre and de Beauvoir engaged in equally
politicized and myopic appropriations of anticolonial movements as
evidence of the emerging proletariat third world revolution.5 Moreover
when it came to decolonization, Albert Camus’ more nuanced views, as
well as his personal background as a pied noir, were used to tarnish his
legitimacy, and, for some, this kind of smearing was effective. It was
also part of how certain thinkers, particularly those on the radical left
such as Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre played the zero sum
game in France. To illustrate, Simone de Beauvoir offered one the best
examples of this “acid tone” regarding Camus:
[. . .] I was revolted by Camus’ refusal to speak [about the torture
of Henri Alleg]. He could no longer argue, as he had done during
the war in Indochina, that he didn’t want to play the Communist’s
game; so he just mumbled something about the problem not being
understood in France. When he went to Stockholm to receive
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his Nobel Prize, he betrayed himself even further. [. . .] In front
of an enormous audience, he declared: ‘I love Justice; but I will
fight for my mother before Justice,’ which amounted to saying
that he was on the side of the pied noirs. The fraud lay in the fact
that he posed at the same time as a man above the battle, thus
providing a warning for those who wanted to reconcile this war
and its methods with bourgeois humanism.6

It is essential to point out that de Beauvoir simply repeated the misquote
of Camus, who really said, “People are planting bombings in the tramways of Algiers. My mother might be on one of those tramways. If that
is justice, then I prefer my mother.”7 The original misquote is attributed
to Le Monde journalist, Dominique Birmann, who covered Camus while
in Stockholm to receive his Nobel Prize and who inaccurately reported
on the infamous December 12, 1957, incident. During this incident,
Camus was rather discourteously heckled by an FLN representative at a
gathering of Swedish students. Camus himself sent his own correction
to this story, which was published on December 17, 1957, and noted the
inaccurate accounting of what he said and explained that he also understood the young Algerian’s “despair and unhappiness.”8
So, while I also must confess that I find Camus’ reluctance to engage
in the Henri Alleg torture controversy surprising,9 I cite this particular
and especially caustic passage of de Beauvoir’s memoirs, Hard Times,
because it reveals a few assumptions held by radical anticolonialists in
France, the most important being that Albert Camus, guided by ethics,
could have and should distanced himself from the pieds noirs; that his
refusal to align with intellectuals like Sartre and de Beauvoir on anticolonialism was symptomatic of “bourgeois humanism.” The fact that
he did not embrace their radical anticolonial stance and remained on
the side of the pieds noirs undermined his claims to represent ‘justice.’
Obviously, this is not how Camus thought, nor was it how he played
the intellectual game in France by this time. To be sure, he was in fact
a pied noir, but he was one the most vocal critics of an entrenched and
uncompromising settler politics throughout the 1930s and 1940s, well
before either Sartre or de Beauvoir took any interest in colonial issues.
Hence, while de Beauvoir and Sartre played this vicious zero sum game
out of the belief that they better understood the terms of the debate,
the zero sum game regarding Algeria was neither fun nor frankly that
relevant for Camus. The stakes, for him, were indeed real and personal.
After all, was it wrong to be on the side of pieds noirs as inhabitants of
French North Africa?
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To be sure, Camus did not hold either Sartre or de Beauvoir in much
esteem by this point, but the difference was that he kept most of his insults
private. For example, in a letter written on May 26, 1959, to Jean Grenier,
he described his contempt for France’s high and mighty anticolonials:
The people of 14 juillet contest everything, indeed, except
themselves and their own ideas. Yet that would be the most
urgent thing to do. But the Left is so eager to change the world
that they forget to look and see what it is and what it is becoming. The result is that they make up the most backward district
on the intellectual landscape and Paris smells provincial, very
much so, because of these offensive lunatics. None of us loves
truth enough. But at least we can make an effort. With them, no
effort, their nature loathes truth. I have really suffered from this.
But I could care less now, and my concerns are truly elsewhere.10

Camus did not deny the legitimacy of the public’s rightful outrage
over French politics vis-à-vis Algeria—the military’s coup d’état that
brought de Gaulle to power was, of course, problematical—he publically
expressed his own outrage over the military abuses.11 He also openly
chastised the political incompetency of French leaders throughout Algerian Chronicles but did so only as means to work toward a legitimate
solution to the current crisis. He had no patience for leftist abstractions
about Marxism and radial anticolonialism during this era.
The trick, therefore, with Albert Camus today is not to read his writings
on Algeria as a dogmatic public thinker and writer, i.e., a player of the
zero sum game, but instead as an anticolonial thinker. That seems easy
enough. But the problem, of course, is that when dealing with a topic such
as French anticolonialism and the Cold War (in the 1950s especially), we
are dealing with an era that produced dogmatic thinking and zero sum
postcolonial realities. It is full of clichés, stereotypes, utopian fantasies
and, most importantly, violence. Nowhere was the zero sum game, with
its baggage of clichés, more lethal than in Algeria from 1954 to 1962.
Most historians view this event as the most violent war of national liberation produced by the idea of anticolonialism, one that changed France
and Algeria forever. In this war, the group to which Camus belonged,
the French settlers of Algeria (the pied noir community) were the tragic
losers, and in the abstractions and logic that many radical anticolonials
sought to enforce, there was either very little room or no room at all for
these European settlers in a postcolonial Algeria.
Nevertheless from 1954 to 1960 Camus tried to maintain his calm, to
act rationally, to strive for peace, and ensure any dialogue he engaged in
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with other writers about Algeria would be respectful and work towards a
solution for his own community, for France, and for Algeria. He played
an anticolonial game, but rationally, and he bet, like the contemporary
economist John Nash, against the logic of a traditional zero sum game.
The great insight of Nash, Camus’ contemporary and future fellow Nobel
Laureate, was to re-imagine the zero sum game. Nash did so in 1950
as a doctoral student at Princeton by advancing the simple and brilliant
proposition: that each player makes moves independently but with the
expectation that these moves remain rational and mutually beneficial.
Camus thought about colonialism and morality in a similar fashion and
believed that games ought not be ruled by the fallacies of a zero sum
logic. Be that as it may, Camus’ hopes were to be disappointed, and the
“Nash Equilibrium” (as it was later called) or something like it,12 could
not be transposed onto Algeria, where each of the warring parties (especially the radical pieds noirs and the OAS) refused to act in mutually
beneficial ways. The violence of the French military and the FLN had
forced the war into the confines of a traditional zero sum game. Hence,
each principal colonial and anticolonial player in the Algerian drama, the
French State, the FLN, the OAS, etc., played a totalizing zero sum game
with a terrifying logic of absolute violence. Moreover, it is vital to point
out that for Camus, the war’s resolution in 1962 remained completely
unthinkable (because there had never been a colonial exodus of this
magnitude before), and from Camus’ perspective, mad; a history with
no future, a time of unimaginable exodus.

The Sui Generis Bias: the Teleology of Radical Anticolonism’s Zero Sum Game
One of the biggest problems of this war for French intellectuals was
the lack of consensus on what anticolonialism meant and the resulting
partisan nature of this debate.13 The current and ongoing political investment in this history obviously creates problems for historical understanding because we historians often view this war through the lens of a very
simple unexamined bias that seems to exist sui generis. What is this sui
generis bias? That radical anticolonialism was right, that the pieds noirs
had no place in Algeria after independence, and that the radical, leftist
anticolonial support for the FLN had proven to be on the right side of
history. But does this phrase, in this instance mean anything? Do these
violent wars of national liberation really have a “right side?” Was Camus
really on the wrong side of history?
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The problem, of course, is that the bias of the “right side” of a zero
sum anticolonial game has in fact generated a particular and clear teleology for understanding liberation during the French-Algerian War. Seeing
the outcome (the exodus of pieds noirs in 1962) as inevitable, it directly
affects how historians think about the decolonization of Algeria. To
clarify, from the perspective of today, we know independence happened,
we know that as a result roughly a million pieds noirs (including a very
large Jewish population) were ferried to France across the Mediterranean
in the summer of 1962 in a desperate panic. Yet this result, where European settlers frantically packed their suitcases (they were allowed only
two!) was not in itself inevitable. Yes, it happened, but does that mean
that the prophets of radical anticolonialism won the zero sum game? At
the very least, the biases of their position obscure the actual historical
contingencies of decolonization.
This is not to suggest that I think Camus was always correct or that he
fully understood the desire of FLN and its supporters to win liberation
at all costs. I do not believe he ever came to terms with the FLN, and,
as a result, criticisms of his shortcomings on this issue by anticolonial
Algerian writers such as Mouloud Feraoun are quite valid, as are the
criticisms of FLN partisans such as Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi.14 Yet, even
though independence ended with the pieds noirs flight in 1962, one should
not misread Camus’ efforts to propose an alternative outcome (as de
Beauvoir would have it), as evidence of “bourgeois humanism,” which
is to say of a colonist impulse. The evidence is in Camus’ writings, and
the fact is that anticolonialism could have taken multiple paths during the
decolonization of Algeria. Nowhere was it pre-determined that the pieds
noirs were going to leave at the end of this war. Hence, Camus should
not be read as being ‘morally wrong’ in working towards a solution that
would have allowed for both Europeans and non-Europeans to continue
living in Algeria together.
The problem with understanding Camus on Algeria is that the outcome
(the exodus) in many way sets up a reading of him that is framed by the
results of a zero sum game. Consequently, Camus is often read backwards
today, and knowing that the unprecedented exodus of European settlers
happened, this historical knowledge tints readings of him. It is therefore
hard to discuss this war and Camus’ unique position within it without
writing to this end (the exodus). Therefore, the re-insertion of Albert
Camus in a specific place and a specific time and without premonitory
reference to the end of the war/the exodus is important because he, more
than any other writer, makes us question historical (but not historicized)
biases and consequently question end game of decolonization in Algeria.
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In other words, accepting the results of the war as evidence of the moral
and logical superiority of the radical anticolonial position (which is
exactly how radical anticolonials in France like Sartre and de Beauvoir
and even Frantz Fanon argued) it creates problems for historians, at least
it did for me earlier in my career, because it diminishes our empathy for
intellectuals like Camus who were settlers/pieds noirs and anticolonial
à la fois. And there’s the rub.
French radical anticolonialism is different from other forms of European anticolonialism and even different strains of nationalist thought.
Writers such as Jean-Paul Sartre defended it as a matter of principle,
regardless of the outcome, because the abstractions he used to justify
his position were morally and theoretically consistent with his notions
of socialist/Marxist revolutions and with the kind of liberation that these
ideologies anticipated. Whereas, and quite importantly, Camus held no
such faith in Sartre’s socialist/Marxist abstractions or in the type of radical
anticolonialism that issued from these ideologies. Here it is extremely
important to point out that by 1936 Camus had been disabused of the
belief that Communism/Marxism was on the side of the oppressed and
colonized Algerian nationalists, and he was in fact forced out of the
French Communist Party (PCF) because, as he writes, he had recruited
Algerian nationalists affiliated with the Etoile Norde Africaine to the
PCF.15 It is also worth pointing out that it took another 20 years for one
of the leading spokesman of anticolonialism, Aimé Césaire (author of
Discourse on Colonialism), to break with the PCF because he had finally
arrived at the same conclusions about communism and anticolonialism
that Camus had in 1936, the conclusion being that the Communist Party
was unresponsive to the anticolonial movement and indeed acting as a
colonizing force itself.16
As a fervent anticolonial intellectual, Camus objected to how the effects of the zero sum game of radical anticolonialism—based in France
on abstractions like Marxism and communism—would impact his own
kin, the pieds noirs, and Algerians alike. So, rather than continue to
play it, he chose silence because he was playing a different anticolonial
game entirely, one like Nash’s, one in which moves would be mutually
beneficial, rational, and based on reality rather than on an imagined
Marxist dialectic. Camus believed there could be more than one winner
of anticolonialism; rather than winner-take-all, his Algeria was home to
pieds noirs and Algerians who might work together toward a common,
non-violent world of equality and brotherhood. The zero sum game of
radical anticolonialism, on the other hand, could not account for because
it refused to accommodate place of the pieds noirs in this new (also
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imagined) world rid of colonial injustices. Historians must thus suppress
the idea of the inevitability of independence in order to account for the
forces of historical contingency and see variations in the anticolonial
positions, especially Camus’.
It is crucial to keep in mind that that Albert Camus did not have the
opportunity to reformulate his ideas. His untimely death in 1960 sealed
his ideas and perhaps our views of them in the time capsule of permanent
critique and in the logic of this very brutal war of national liberation, a
logic that ultimately cast the pieds noirs (from the point of view of radical anticolonial thinkers) as colonialism’s reactionary losers and which
also characterized Camus’ views as depassé. Hence, his critics’ labeling
of his views as neo-colonial stuck to him, despite his efforts to shake
those representations. Perhaps the time has come to open and explore
the contents of this capsule, all the while recalling a self-observation
Camus once made: “I don’t have the imagination to want to be someone
else.”17 Indeed, since Camus confessed his limitations in this regard, it
is crucial that we do our part in not trying to imagine him wishing to be
other than who he was.
The problem, of course, is that many of his closer friends and most
vehement adversaries imagined that Camus should have wanted to be
other than what he was precisely because he was a leading anticolonial
writer, the most informed on the abuses of the French state and the
colonial lobby in Algeria, and had stood for justice during WWII. His
actions in this regard were heroic and unique. Perhaps only Simone Weil
comes as close in tone to criticisms of French colonialism more generally
during the interwar period. Hence, that his very vocal anticolonialism
did not radicalize to accommodate the new nationalist conception of
revolution that emerged after 1954 pained French anticolonialists. Their
pain regarding his anticolonial views was intolerable to Camus. After the
publication of The Rebel in 1951, when he criticized the sacred metanarratives of the French left, one of them being that revolutions liberate
man, he quickly fell out favor with many wartime friends. Hostility was
already palpable especially after the debate sparked by The Rebel, but
after the Stockholm controversy in 1957, Camus was openly derided by
many French intellectuals. He described the pain of this period in another
letter to Grenier written on July 28, 1958: “As for me, I am finding it
more and more difficult to live facing a wall. And difficult for an artist
to work, alone, without being supported by anything.”18
As a reform-minded anticolonial who argued for an end to colonial
domination but also for a future in Algeria where both European and
non-European communities would work democratically together, Camus
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refused to justify the extreme violence of the FLN, although he was appalled by the repression of the French military. Re-reading Camus today,
especially Algerian Chronicles, a sadness and an agony resonate in this
moderate anticolonial position. To better illustrate the term “radical
French anticolonialism,” imagine that Camus had been born in a different
colonial setting, say in Southern Rhodesia or South Africa, where there
were also large numbers of European settlers that went back generations.
In this setting, it is doubtful that he would have been so violently attacked
by the Left. In fact, an aparetheid government would have considered
his open criticisms and calls for reform as anticolonial heresy. He may
have, as did many Afrikaner writers who opposed apartheid, gone to jail
for his criticisms of European abuses and could have been banned. For
instance, Camus openly criticized the metropolitan government’s stupid
and brutal repression of nationalists. His comments, if made against the
Afrikaner regime, likely would have rendered him an anti-apartheid hero,
like may South African writers who were banned and persecuted for their
opposition to the status quo. Breyten Breytenbach (South African), Doris
Lessing (Southern Rhodesian), Nadine Gordimer (South African), J. M.
Coetzee (South African) and most especially André Brink (South African)
come immediately to mind as European settlers with comparable politics
and stature as writers.
In fact, like Lessing, Camus opposed the colonial abuses of natives,
wrote about these abuses, and left the colonial world because of its institutionalized racism and violence. (After all, he was asked to leave by the
government in Algeria in 1940 because he was perceived to be a threat to
its security as a journalist at Alger-Républicain, though he did return to
Oran the next year, where he completed The Stranger). Why is it, then,
that European settlers who opposed the abuses of the colonial system
in Southern Africa are anticolonial, even though these same Europeans
would have disputed that all settlers are bad and that they needed to leave
with two suitcases? Not all committed anticolonial intellectuals of the
same stature of Camus argued that all African nationalist movements
deserved unqualified support or that all of their methods were acceptable.
Yet these nuances are ignored in the case of Algeria and Camus. Why
does a thinker of Camus’ notoriety, who is openly critical of the colonial/
settler status quo end up in such a quandary in which it was deemed offensive by leftist French intellectuals to talk about his own origins as a
pied noir intellectual? One of the great ironies, of course, is that while
members of the French left like Sartre and de Beauvoir derided Camus
for his origins, calm, and efforts to reconcile the European and nonEuropean populations in Algeria, Afrikaner writers struggled to achieve
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the same kind of democratic and humane justice in South Africa (despite
massive intimidation and threats).
Consider the case of André Brink. In his memoir, A Fork in the Road,
he writes:
And then there is Camus. Who promptly became, and still is, one
of the Baudelairean phases of my life. I do not merely admire
Camus, I love him. And one of the most profoundly moving
pilgrimages of my life, move than twenty years after first reading La peste, was to Lourmarin in the Vaucluse, to stand at the
simple slab of his grave overgrown by rosemary in the uncompromising sun of Provence. Camus: the indefatigable persistence
of Sisyphus, the revolt-without-end, the struggle, literally to
death, against injustice, against the lie, against unfreedom. He
provided not only a map for my exploration of Paris, of France,
but a blueprint for the rest of my life.19

Like Camus, Brink openly criticized the racist and undemocratic regime
that was destroying his country, and like Camus, Brink constantly returned to fiction and essays, written in Afrikaans, as a weapon against
apartheid and racism. Finally, like Camus, Brink never argued that in
order to overcome colonialism the settlers (Afrikaners or any others)
would have to accept the zero sum game that culminated in an exodus
of whites from South Africa.
Camus and Brink shared the same basic belief that Africans and Europeans could live together in a postcolonial world of economic and racial
equality. In fact, it is clear that Camus’ efforts to work towards justice
and equality in Algeria, a justice and equality that did not eliminate the
settlers/pieds noirs made perfect sense to Brink, who was studying literature in Paris as a graduate student during the French-Algerian War:
And then Camus, who had been my Bible, made vade mecum,
died in that absurd car accident, at Pont-sur-Yonne, just north
of Sens, on the highway to Paris, at 13:54 on 4 January, 1960.
Just when the gloom of depression which had surrounded him
ever since he received the Nobel Prize, and even before, seemed
to be lifting; just as he seemed to be finding his way back into
writing; just as life seemed to be becoming, if not meaningful
by any means, but worthwhile again—that is, an absurdity worth
living for—a wholly gratuitous death had the last word. For me,
in those circumstances, at that moment in my life, nothing could
have confirmed the significance of Camus in a more definitive—more final—manner as his death. It lent a solemnity, even
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a profundity, to every reading and rereading of Camus I made
over the nearly fifty years that have passed since then. It meant
that for the rest of my life I would never be without his shadow,
or the shadow of his light.
Seventeen years later another man died, with much the same
devastating effect on my mind and my life, even though the manner of it was totally different, and the circumstances incomparably
so. This was Steve Biko. And in a curious way there was a line
running from the first to the second.20

Like Camus, Brink did not believe that his compatriots in South Africa
were a lost cause and that they could not be brought to reason. In fact,
Brink deliberately used Afrikaans to express his dissident ideas. He
needed to address his fellow Afrikaners in their own language. For Brink,
change, real change, had to come from within.
Likewise, for Camus, the pieds noirs had a chance in Algeria, a real
chance, but they would have to accept equality and equal rights for all
inhabitants of Algeria. As Camus explained in his article, “The Political Malaise”: “But our Algerian policy is so distorted by prejudice and
ignorance that to offer an objective account based on accurate information is already to render an important service. That is what I intend to
do . . .”21 The stakes were high:
In this lovely country, now glorious with spring blossoms and
sunshine, people suffering from hunger are demanding justice.
We cannot remain indifferent to their suffering, because we have
experienced it ourselves.
Rather than respond with condemnations, let us try to understand the reasons for their demands and invoke on their behalf
the same democratic principles we claim for ourselves.22

We thus confront a puzzle: while an inspiration to an Afrikaner writer and
staunch critic of apartheid like André Brink, Camus was dismissed and
derided by French radical anticolonial intellectuals? In their defense, part
of their criticism of Camus came from an honest lack of understanding
about Camus’ anticolonial politics. His anticolonialism did not require
the removal of the European settler, either by force or by choice from
Algeria. Moreover, his refusal to see revolution as a panacea transcended
the Algerian problem because, as he had already written in The Rebel, the
revolutionary utopian impulse put aside facts to “remain faithful to the
prophesy.”23 The difference between Camus and his radical anticolonial
opponents is that he distrusted the revolutionary impulse and did not see
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the necessity of coupling anticolonialism with a Marxist/socialist view
of revolution. Hence his effort to decouple anticolonialism from revolution. From Camus’ perspective, revolutionary and radical anticolonialism
was doomed to certain and bloody failure: “Every revolutionary ends
by becoming an oppressor or a heretic. In the purely historical universe
that they have chosen, rebellion and revolution end in the same dilemma:
either police rule or insanity.”24
Camus foresaw Algeria’s path, and he grasped earlier than most the
outcome of radical anticolonialism. Algeria did, in fact, become a police
state after independence. The FLN dictatorship lasted for decades, and
even today, the corrupt revolutionary-era elite that came to power after
independence continues to rule the country through an oppressive and
all-powerful police and military-security apparatus. There is no question,
therefore, that on the level of historical postcolonialism, Camus’ predictions were correct about where radical anticolonialism and the zero sum
game it produced would take the country.
By way of conclusion, let us measure the ethical chasm between Camus’ reformist anticolonialism and Sartre’s radical anticolonialism. In
“Colonialism is a System,” first published in Les temps moderns (1956),
Sartre writes: “I would like to put you on guard against what might be
called ‘neocolonialist mystification.’ Neo-colonialists think that there
are some good colonists and some very wicked ones, and that it is the
fault of the latter that the situation of the colonies has deteriorated.”25 Not
only must the French rid themselves of this delusion, Sartre exhorted,
but they must also draw the proper lesson:
Colonialism is in the process of destroying itself. But it still fouls
the atmosphere. It is our shame; it mocks our laws and caricatures
them. [. . .] Our role is to help it to die. Not only in Algeria but
wherever it exists. People who talk about the abandonment of
Algeria are imbeciles. There is no abandoning what we have
never owned. [. . .] But above all let us not allow ourselves to be
diverted from our task by a reformist mystification. The neocolonialist is a fool who still believes that the colonial system can
be overhauled—or a clever cynic who proposes reforms because
he knows that they are ineffective.26

Camus’ reply to this zero sum logic comes in his essay, “A Clear Conscience”:
The gulf between metropolitan France and the French of Algeria
has never been wider. To consider the metropole first, it is as if
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their long-overdue indictment of France’s policy of colonization has been extended to all French living in Algeria. If you
read certain newspapers, you get the impression that Algeria
is a land of a million whip-wielding, cigar-chomping colonists
driving around in Cadillacs. This is a dangerous cliché. To heap
scorn on a million of our fellow Frenchmen or to quietly disdain
them, indiscriminately blaming all for the sins of a few, can only
hinder rather than encourage the progress that everyone claims
to want [. . .]
[. . .] Yet these same ordinary people are the first victims of
the present situation. They are not the ones placing ads in the
papers, looking at property to buy in Provence or apartments
in Paris. They were born in Algeria and they will die there, and
their hope is that they will not die in terror or be massacred
in the pit of some mine. Must these hardworking Frenchmen,
who live in isolated and rural towns and villages, be sacrificed
to expiate the immense sins of French colonization? [. . .] It is
easy to allow others to be sacrificed, and if the French of Algeria
bear their share of responsibility, the French of France must not
forget theirs either.27

Let us be clear: Camus did not desire the full independence of Algeria
from France and he proposed a formal relationship between the two countries. As a public intellectual, he argued for a federated Algeria in which
the pieds noirs would have a place. But privately, and again in a letter
to his most trusted friend, Jean Grenier, Camus reveals he was resigned
to a different future: “I believe as you do that it is undoubtedly too late
for Algeria. I did not say that in my book because lo peor no es siempre
seguro [sic] (the worst is not always a sure thing)—because historical
randomness must have its chance—and because one does not write to
say that everything is screwed up. In that case, one remains silent. I am
preparing myself for that.”28
Did Camus’ complex stance on Algeria make him a neocolonist, as
Sartre would have one believe? I think not. We have seen the consistency
of his anticolonial positions, based on the conviction that a fair and equal
democratic partnership between non-Europeans and Europeans in Algeria
could be built. In Camus’ anticolonialist vision, there could be justice
and equality for all men and women in Algeria—Muslims, Europeans,
Jews, Berbers, and Arabs alike. His anticolonialism—like André Brink’s
and the other “whites” who opposed apartheid as “whites” in South Africa—would not have been a zero sum game anymore. Unfortunately, for
Camus, this is how the game of decolonization is remembered because
that is how it was played out, as a zero sum anticolonial game in Algeria.
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